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Bogenschneider: On the Federal Excise Tax Exemption for U.S. Gasoline Exports

Abstract:

Featured Article

Exports of refined gasoline are exempt from Federal excise
taxation. Accordingly, an increase in the Federal excise tax on
gasoline may simply increase the market price of gasoline in
the U.S. and encourage the export of gasoline to foreign
markets, primarily West Africa and Latin America. Any
reduction in negative environmental externalities from an
increase in the Federal gasoline excise tax in the United States
is therefore likely to be mooted (or perhaps made worse) on a
global basis. The Federal excise tax on gasoline appears to be
the most regressive form of taxation when both direct and
indirect costs are taken into account. This article is the first to
estimate the indirect costs (i.e., imbedded transports costs) to
U.S. persons of a Federal gasoline and diesel taxes using data
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey of 2012. This article
further updates and expands Poterba´s (1991) empirical
calculation of the regressivity of the Federal gasoline tax based
on direct gasoline expenditures. Finally, this article
recommends that the Jones Act restrictions on gasoline
shipment between the Gulf Coast refineries and East Coast
terminals be removed.
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I.

burden” of this taxation. As explained by Goldin (2012):
“Commodity taxes generate excess burden by distorting
consumers´ decisions about which goods to purchase…. The
larger these ´avoidance costs´ the greater the tax´s excess
burden.”8

Introduction.

Much of the prior legal and economic literature on Federal
gasoline taxation proposes a Pigovian tax approach where the
individual American consumer is forced into paying the full
price at the pump to account for any externalities from the
consumption of gasoline. 5 The negative externalities can
therefore be reduced or optimized by domestic tax policy
alone.6 But, according to the Congressional Budget Office and
National Research Council, the estimate of gasoline
externalities is 26 cents per gallon, but the currently existing
Federal and state gasoline taxes average 41 cents per gallon.7
The combined gasoline excise taxes more than account for the
externalities by this estimate. Thus, not only is the gasoline tax
not a “free lunch” to the economy, but there is an “excess
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$

Gasoline taxes also fall disproportionately on the persons least
able to pay. Within the discipline of tax policy this is referred
to generally as a “regressive” form of taxation. BrunnerBrown (2013) translates such tax theory into the domestic
economic policy implications of the excise tax, (i.e., the
“incidence” of the gasoline excise tax), as follows:
Excise taxes are not the solution to
transportation preference and automobile
congestion because they are simply ineffective.
Excise taxation discounts the variety of other
externalities
that
affect
transportation
selection… the increased costs may impose a
large, disproportionate burden on those least
able to pay them…. This is not consistent with
policy goals, but rather conflicts with optimal
transportation mode composition.9

5

N. Gregory Mankiw, Smart Taxes: An Open Invitation to Join the Pigou
Club, EASTERN ECON. J. 35 (2009) (“The economics here is
straightforward: emitting carbon into the atmosphere entails a negative
externality. In absence of any policy, people will emit too much. The
Pigovian policy response is to impose a tax on carbon emission.”); N.
Gregory Mankiw, Gas Tax Now! Fortune Magazine (May 24, 1999); ShiLing Hsu, The Politics and Psychology of Gasoline Taxes: An Empirical
Study, 15 WIDENER L. REV. 363, at Note 2 (2010) citing William J. Baumol
& Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy 21-23 (2d ed.
1988). (“´Pigouvian´ is meant to describe a tax that would be consistent
with Pigou's prescription that a tax equal to the marginal social harm from
pollution should be imposed to provide just the right amount of disincentive
for pollution. Alfred C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (1928). Taxes
that reflected the extent of negative externality thus became known as
“Pigouvian” taxes.”).
6
Congressional Budget Office, The Economic Costs of Fuel Economy
Standards Versus a Gasoline Tax (Dec. 2003) at v.
7
Id.
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Jacob Goldin, Sales Tax Not Included: Designing Commodity Taxes for
Inattentive Consumers, 122 YALE L.J. 258, 276 (2012) (“Consumers who
substitute away from the taxed good do not contribute to the tax's revenue;
but, having switched their consumption to a less desirable bundle of goods
in order to avoid the tax, they are still worse off because of the tax.”).
9
John Andrew Brunner-Brown, Thirty Minutes or Less: The Inelasticity of
Commuting, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 355 (2013).
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refined as of the year 2011.12 The anecdotal reports from
major news agencies suggest both gasoline and U.S. crude oil
exports may be increasing. 13 However, since the Energy
Information Agency relies exclusively on data provided by the
American Petroleum Institute, an exact or more up-to-date
gasoline export data remains unavailable.

But, an optimal transportation analysis of economic policy
analysis takes into account only the domestic U.S. policy
implications of an increase in the Federal excise tax on
gasoline. People all over the world use gasoline – not just
Americans. Indeed, gasoline, diesel fuel, and other refined
petroleum products exported out of the United States are
exempt from the Federal excise tax. 10 As a matter of
international tax policy, if either gasoline or crude oil is a
commodity that can be exported to other nations, then the
policymaker must consider both the domestic and international
implications of a domestic excise tax on that commodity in the
United States.11 This is especially true where the exports of
gasoline are exempt from taxation, thereby creating a potential
tax incentive to export gasoline (or diesel). As it turns out,
U.S. refiners indeed exported at least 18% of total gasoline

Accordingly, because the prior economic analysis does not
seem to consider the potential for export of gasoline by U.S.
refiners to world markets without payment of the Federal
excise tax, the “poll” of economists of Federal gasoline taxes
may represent more fundamentally a survey of the proportion
of economists who favor regressive domestic tax policies
generally. 14 As to Federal excise taxes in particular, such
classic tax policy view is given anecdotally as: “Bah, let them
drive a hybrid!” But, several empirical studies now show that
low-income persons are often unable to drive fuel-efficient

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
10

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$

26 U.S.C. §§ 4081, 4083; IRS Publication 510 at 6 (“Exception. The tax
does not apply to a sale if all of the following apply: The buyer´s principal
place of business is not in the United States; The sale occurs as the fuel is
delivered into a transport vessel with a capacity of at least 20,000 barrels of
fuel; The seller is a registrant and the exporter of record; The fuel was
exported.”); see also: Practical Law (Thomson Reuters) available at
http://us.practicallaw.com/1-524-3130?q=&qp=&qo=&qe= (last checked
December 8, 2014) (“Taxes on the import and export of oil and gas: USA.
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund Tax imposed on petroleum produced in or
imported to the US: 2009 to 2016: US $0.08 per barrel. 2017: US $0.09 per
barrel. Tariffs on oil imports range from US$0.0525 to US$0.525 per barrel
depending on the type of petroleum. Oil and petroleum products from some
countries are duty-free due to trade agreements and Congressional
programmes.”).
11
Theo Eicher, John Mutti & Michelle Turnovsky, International Economics
(7th ed.) (Routledge Publishing, New York, 2009) at 143.
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U.S. Energy Information Administration. Independent Statistics and
Analysis available at http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=687&t=10
(“Gasoline exports were about 18% of total U.S. petroleum product exports
in 2011…. Distillate fuel exports were about 30% of total U.S. petroleum
product exports in 2011.”).
13
Reuters, U.S. Refiners Export More Fuel Than Ever: American
Companies Export Energy Boom World-Wide (Oct. 8, 2013); The
Washington Times, U.S. energy giants use crude oil loophole to post record
petroleum exports (May 11, 2014).
14
Mankiw, supra Note 1 at 21-2 (“[P]art of a US gasoline tax gets paid by
the producers of oil, not the consumers. This is an example of what
economists call the optimal tariff argument…. . Some might fear these taxes
would be particularly hard on those at the bottom of the economic ladder.
Yet that is not necessarily the case…. The poor are far more likely than
higher-income households to ride the bus or subway to work.”).
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vehicles. Chernick & Reschovsky say: “The data indicate that
poorer families tend to drive older and less fuel efficient cars
than families with higher incomes.”15 As West (2005) further
explains, “poor vehicle owning households drive vehicles that
pollute more than those owned by wealthy households.” 16
Thus, the classical tax policy view becomes the modern
environmental law equivalent to Marie Antoinette´s supposed
glib: “Bah, let them eat cake!”17

U.S. consumers of gasoline. Such an analysis is necessary
because diesel fuel and gasoline are used to transport many
consumer goods. In this article, we therefore expand and
update the results of Poterba (1991) who applied the Consumer
Expenditure Survey of 1985, to calculate the regressivity of
direct gasoline expenditures by income level. However, here
we go beyond Poterba´s (1991) analysis and also estimate the
indirect costs of gasoline taxation. The indirect effects are
found to be roughly an incremental 50% increase in the
respective regressive effects of the gasoline expenditures by
U.S. households from prior measurements. Accordingly,
comparing generally the recent calculation by Bogenschneider
(2014) on the regressivity of payroll taxation, the gasoline tax
appears to be the most regressive of any form of domestic
taxation.19

This article summarizes and expounds the prior literature on
the regressive effects of gasoline taxation. The indirect cost of
gasoline taxation was excluded from Poterba´s (1991) seminal
economic study. 18 Therefore, in order to generate a
comprehensive estimate of the regressive effect of gasoline
taxation, the indirect cost of the Federal gasoline tax must be
calculated in addition to the direct tax expenditures paid by

Finally, this article traces the tax subsidies offered in the
Internal Revenue Code to oil producers, and compares these in
magnitude with Federal excise tax collections. The ability of
U.S. refiners to export refined gasoline to foreign markets
appears to partially moot (or reverse) both the potential
national security and carbon reduction externality justifications
for higher rates of Federal gasoline taxation given by numerous
economic studies. Nonetheless, if the policymaker considers
these to be important policy goals, then a comparison of the
regressive effect of gasoline taxes to the potential policy
benefits of such tax policy is required.

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
15

Howard Chernick & Andrew Reschovsky, Who Pays the Gasoline Tax?
50 NAT´L TAX J. 2 (1997).
16
Sarah E. West, Equity Implications of Vehicle Emissions Taxes, 39 JRN´L
OF TRANSPORT ECON & POL´Y 1 (2005); see also: James A. Kahn, Gasoline
Prices and the Used Automobile Market: A Rational Expectations Asset
Price Approach, 101 Quart. J. Econ. 2 (1986).
17
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1765). Confessions. (ed. Angela Scholar) (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 262 (misattributing perhaps the
quote to Marie Antoinette “Qu’ils mangent de la brioche.“ The quote does
appear to be correctly attributed to an unidentified contemporaneous
princess of the period.).
18
James M. Poterba, Is the Gasoline Tax Regressive? in “Tax Policy and
the Economy” v. 5 (ed. David Bradford) (The MIT Press 1990), at 150
(“This study does not attempt to analyze the distribution of indirect gasoline
tax expenditures, i.e., the taxes that may be collected fom the retail
distribution sector but eventually passed on to consumers.”).
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See: Bret N. Bogenschneider, The Effective Tax Rate of U.S. Persons by
Income Level, 145 TAX NOTES 117 (Oct. 6, 2014).
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As to the Federal excise tax on gasoline good policy options
are available. The Jones Act set strict maritime limits on the
tankers which can be used to ship refined gasoline from the
Gulf Coast refineries to the East Coast distribution terminals.20
Accordingly, the cost of shipping gasoline by tanker to
Western Africa is alleged to be less than the cost of shipment to
the East Coast.21 The shipping cost issue is thus given as an
explanation for the export of refined gasoline from the Gulf
Coast. The policy purpose of the Jones Act appears to be both
to ensure U.S. persons are employed in the maritime transport
of refined gasoline between U.S. ports, and also an
environmental protection goal that tankers operating between
U.S. ports be subject to U.S. regulation to avoid the potential of
a gasoline spill in coastal waters. Both of these policy goals
are very important. However, the recent B.P. oil spill in the
Gulf of Mexico indicates any presumption that U.S.
crewmembers may be able to implement better safety

conditions is inconclusive. The primary thesis of this paper is
that the Jones Act should be modified to encourage the
maritime shipment of refined gasoline from the Gulf Coast to
the East Coast.
The remaining possibility is that the shipment of refined
gasoline from the Gulf Coast to West Africa and other
locations did not occur because of incremental maritime
shipping costs, but was instead done primarily for tax
avoidance purposes. All the data indicates the United States is
simultaneously importing and exporting refined gasoline.
Therefore, based on the available evidence we cannot exclude
the possibility that the market price of gasoline in the United
States might be higher than the market price of gasoline in
Latin America or West Africa, but higher by less than the
amount of the incremental Federal excise tax avoided by
exporting the gasoline. Thus, it appears at least possible that
U.S. refiners are exporting gasoline to meet market demand in
West Africa, Latin America, and other nations at the lower
market price specifically in order to avoid the excise tax.
Notably, the net carbon effect externalities may be negative
depending on the efficiency of the gasoline usage abroad –
especially if any portion of the gasoline is allowed to evaporate
directly into the atmosphere or by spillage from open
containers. Under these assumptions, the tax policy options
become multi-faceted. Based on its current international treaty
obligations the United States might be able to impose a tariff
on exported gasoline to those nations receiving gasoline
imports equivalent to the amount of the excise tax.22 However,

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$

20

The Merchant Marine Act, codified as 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (Oct. 6, 2006).
Business Week, Are U.S. Gasoline Exports About to Goose Prices at the
Pump? (Nov. 25, 2013) (“West Africa is also taking more U.S.-made
fuel. Exports to Nigeria shot up to 2.7 million barrels in August. Driving
this growth is a strange price incentive that’s largely a function of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (known also as the Jones Act), which
requires goods transported between U.S. ports to be carried on vessels based
in the U.S., made in the U.S., and crewed mostly by U.S. citizens. A
shortage of these ships has created a bizarre scenario where it’s cheaper to
ship gasoline from Texas to Nigeria than it is to ship it to New York, or to
Florida for that matter. ´I can ship a barrel of gasoline across the Atlantic
for one-third the cost of shipping it to New York from Houston,´ says Fadel
Gheit, an oil and gas analyst at Oppenheimer. Gheit estimates there are only
28 vessels certified by the Jones Act that are allowed to ship fuel between
U.S. ports. He calls them ´the chosen ones´.”).

21
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See generally: 19 U.S.C. §2504(a).
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if the United States is prohibited by international treaty
obligations from imposing such a tariff, then the “deadweight
loss” from the excise tax on gasoline would need to be
calculated in addition to the incremental negative externalities.

Table 1. Direct and Indirect Gasoline Expenditures by Income
Quintile (2012).
U.S. Persons
by Income
Level:

II.
An Estimation of the Indirect Regressivity of Federal
Excise Taxes on Gasoline.

Lowest 20
Percent
Second 20
Percent
Third 20
Percent
Fourth 20
Percent
Highest 20
Percent

The Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes the Consumer
Expenditure Survey with the most current edition being that of
2012. No economic study exists on the imbedded diesel or
gasoline fuel costs in consumer goods representing the indirect
cost of diesel fuel and gasoline excise taxes. However, Cooper
(2014) recently published a calculation of trucking fuel costs
by U.S. household based on the Consumer Expenditure Survey
of 2010.23 Here, we update both studies to the year 2012 as set
forth in Table 1, Column(s) 1, 2. In addition, the methodology
by Cooper (2014) is followed except with the indirect fuel
costs allocated by relative household expenditures rather than
by total households.24
$
$
$
$

Indirect Gas
Expenditure /
Income (%) (2012)

Combined /
Income (%)
(2012)

12.51%

8.56%

21.08%

7.31%

4.52%

11.82%

5.83%

2.02%

7.85%

4.45%

2.96%

7.41%

2.53%

0.00002%

2.53%

Notes: Indirect Gas Expenditure based on Cooper (2014)
study with total commercial fuel expense as $234 billion (most
recent data, 2010) allocated as a ratio of total expenses and
expressed as a percentage of income based on actual CES
household data for 2012. Income is presented without income
accruals for holdings gains. The incidence of the indirect
gasoline tax is assumed to fall entirely on the end consumer.
Poterba (1991) published a calculation on the regressivity of
direct gasoline expenditures based on the Consumer
Expenditure Survey of 1985 as reproduced here in Table 2.
The calculation is updated based on the Consumer Expenditure
Survey of 2012.

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$

23

Mark Cooper, Paying the Freight: The Consumer Benefits of Increasing
the Fuel Economy of Medium and Heavy Duty Trucks, Consumer
Federation
of
America
(February,
2014)
available
at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Paying-the-Freight.pdf.
24
Id. at 4.
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However, most transfer payments received by the poor are
considered “income” by the Federal government and measured
by the survey. One exception might be “food stamps”, but
obviously food stamps are not gas stamps. Instead, the
“higher” expenditures measured in the survey appear to relate
to retired persons in the lowest income bracket spending out of
savings in retirement. If low-income retired persons are forced
to use savings to buy gasoline this does not diminish the
regressivity of a tax. This simply changes the meaning of the
word “regressive” from its colloquial definition. Accordingly,
Poterba´s (1991) relative expenditure calculation relating to
expenditures by the elderly from savings is not presented here.

Table 2. Comparison of Direct Gasoline Expenditures by
Income Quintile 1985 vs 2012.
Direct Gas Expenditure
/ Income (%) (1985)

Direct Gas
Expenditure / Income
(%) (2012)

Lowest 20 Percent

8.99%

12.51%

Second 20 Percent

6.22%

7.31%

Third 20 Percent

4.83%

5.83%

Fourth 20 Percent

4.07%

4.45%

Highest 20 Percent

2.98%

2.53%

U.S. Persons by
Income Level:

Notes: Data simply updated from Poterba (1991). Income is
presented without income accruals for holdings gains.

III.
Crude Oil Production Tax Subsidies versus Federal
Excise Tax Revenues.

In each version of the Consumer Expenditure Survey from
1985 to 2012 the lowest income persons are seen to accrue
expenditures which exceed income. Therefore, Poterba (1991)
and Mankiw (2009) both cite this as justification for using a
ratio of relative expenditures (in lieu of reported income) to
calculate the regressivity of the excise tax on gasoline. By
comparing total expenditures to direct gasoline expenditures
Poterba (1991) was therefore able to say only the middle
income quintiles were worse off relative to the highest income
quintiles. The implication appears to be that low-income
persons are receiving transfer payments not included in income
to purchase gasoline, and therefore are not made worse off by
the Federal excise tax.

As set forth in detail here, infra Table 3, the crude oil
production subsidies offset approximately one-third (1/3) of the
total Federal excise tax receipts. The data here is a composite
of three Joint Committee on Taxation scoring estimates and a
General Accounting Office report some of which were
summarized by Kolarova (2012).25 The domestic crude oil
production level is increasing in the Upper Midwest region so
the prior year estimates may understate the tax expenditure
effect. Also, domestic gasoline consumption is declining
slightly and the most recent Excise Tax data is from the year
1999 which would tend to overstate the tax expenditure effect.
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
25

Temi Kolarova, Oil and Taxes: Refocusing the Tax Policy Question in the
Aftermath of the BP Oil Spill, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 351 (2012).
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The data presented here is a side-by-side comparison of the
Federal Crude Oil Tax subsidies versus the Federal Excise Tax
revenues.

IV.
Estimate of Foregone Revenue on Exempt Exports
of U.S. Gasoline.
The Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) provided a
report in April, 2012, summarizing the total U.S. exports of
petroleum products. This report makes it possible to estimate
the foregone revenue from the excise tax exemption on
gasoline and diesel fuel exported out of the United States. The
CRS report provided as follows:

Table 3. Crude Oil Tax Subsidies versus Federal Excise Tax on Gasoline

Excise Tax (gasoline & diesel):
IRC §4081 (₵18.4 gas; ₵24.4 diesel ) (1999)

$21,236,659

Income Tax Subsidies (U.S. crude oil):
Foreign Tax Credit Disguised Royalties (§907)

($2,550,000)

Domestic Manufacturing Deduction (§199)

($1,825,000)

Oil Well Percentage Depletion (§613)

($1,625,000)

Last-in First-Out (LIFO) Accounting (§263)

($860,000)

Intangible Drilling Cost Expensing (§263)

($650,000)

Tertiarary Injection Expensing (§193)

($100,000)

Enhanced Oil Recovery Credit (§43)

($100,000)
$21,236,659

($7,710,000)

Net:

$13,526,659

U.S. oil exports, made up almost entirely of
petroleum products, averaged 2.9 Mb/d in 2011.
This is up from export of 1.2 Mb/d in 2005, led
by growing export of distillates (diesel and
related fuels) and gasoline. More than 60% of
U.S. exports went to countries in the Western
Hemisphere, particularly to countries such as
Mexico and Canada from which the U.S.
imports crude oil. Exports occur largely as a
result of commercial decisions by oil market
participants which reflect current oil market
conditions as well as past investment in
refining.26

Notes: (amounts in thousands) An $0.08 per barrel Oil Spill
Liability tax applies to Crude Oil production. Any increase in
production in recent years would increase the subsidy estimate.
The Superfund trust find liability tax expired in 1995.

Based on this data an estimate of the potential (i.e., foregone)
revenue from the failure to levy excise tax on exported
petroleum products including gasoline, diesel and other
condensates is presented here in Table 4, infra.

Such data appears to indicate a possible “rule-of-thumb” is
one-third (1/3) of total excise tax receipts are offset by the
subsidies to the oil companies.

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
26

Neelesh Nerurkar, U.S. Oil Imports and Exports, Congressional Research
Service (April 4, 2012).
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members of Congress and their staff are confused about the
Table 4. Estimate of Foregone Revenue from Excise Tax Exemption on potential to tax exports of gasoline under the U.S. Constitution.
Exported Gasoline
Barrels Millions/per day exported (CRS, 2011)
Gallons Conversion (31.5 gallons/barrel)
Annualized

2,900,000

V.
Analysis of the Incidence of an Increase in Federal
Excise Taxes on Gasoline.

91,350,000
33,342,750,000

Excise tax rate ₵20.4 (2/3 gasoline; 1/3 diesel)
Foregone Excise Tax:

Much to the contrary, a significant increase in the Federal
excise tax on gasoline without a prohibition on gasoline
exports from the United States could become an economic and
environmental calamity. The incidence of the tax increase
would fall almost entirely on U.S. consumers and producers
thereby harming the relative competitiveness of the U.S.
economy. 27 Indeed, aggregate demand for gasoline in the
United States would decrease. However, gasoline refiners
could then be expected to export an increasing proportion of
the production of gasoline and other condensates thereby
causing a decrease in gasoline price in foreign markets, and
increasing the foreign demand for gasoline at the now lower
price. This is standard fair in any course in International
Economics. 28
Furthermore, because the environmental
protections are lower in some of the gasoline export markets
the potential for environmental disaster is very real. For
example, it is not inconceivable to calculate unregulated
foreign consumption of cheap gasoline to result in
environmental damage 100 fold or 1,000 fold greater than the
consumption of the same or greater amount of such gasoline in

6,801,921,000
$6.8 billion

An additional portion of the CRS report may provide insight
into the failure to levy an excise tax on gasoline exports. The
CRS report stated:
Oil Export Tariff.
Instead of prohibiting
exports, some have suggested a federal tax,
tariff, or duty on exports. However, these are
generally prohibited by Article 1, section 9,
clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution, which states
that “No Tax or Duty shall be laid on articles
exported from any State.”
To the contrary, the U.S. Constitution obviously does not
prevent the Federal government from levying a tax on exported
gasoline or any petroleum product. The provision cited
prevents each individual state within the United States from
levying such a tariff. However, that is irrelevant to the Federal
government´s power to levy the excise tax on petroleum
products. Also the U.S. Constitution´s prohibition on direct
taxes does not apply to the excise tax applied on export of a
petroleum product. As such, it appears possible that some
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See: Eicher, Mutti & Turnovsky (2009), supra Note 11.
Compare: N. Gregory Mankiw, Raise the Gas Tax, Wall Street Journal
(Oct. 20, 2006).
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the United States. Any open-container spillage or evaporation
of gasoline on a wider scale is almost unthinkable from an
environmental perspective.

counterparts in the middle of the expenditure
distribution. Although households in the top
5% of the total spending distribution spend
significantly less on gasoline (as a share of
expenditures) than those who are less well off,
gasoline´s expenditure share is much more
stable across the population than the ratio of
gasoline outlays to current income.30

VI.
On the Regressivity of Federal Excise Taxes on
Gasoline.
The regressivity of the taxation on gasoline is not a myth. 29
The only category of taxation near to the Federal excise tax on
gasoline in terms of regressivity is the combined payroll taxes
paid by U.S. workers. A direct comparison between the
regressive effects of the gasoline tax versus the payroll tax can
be made with Table 1 here with the tax table of
Bogenschneider (2014) on taxes by U.S. persons generally. A
comparison of “regressivity” however can only be made
specifically by pairing the data, i.e., to say the tax is regressive
as to whom and to say whether the regressivity is increasing or
decreasing over time. Here, the aggregate amount of gasoline
expenditures generally has increased roughly 50% between
1985 and 2012 for the lowest income quintile of U.S. persons
as a percentage of income. However, Poterba (1991) implies
that the gasoline tax may not be regressive, with the following:

However, as a matter of tax policy “middle-class regressivity”
remains “regressivity”. There is nothing in the jurisprudence
of tax policy to support Poterba´s (1991) assertion that tax
policies favoring the ultra-rich are not “regressive” merely
because the regressivity effects only accrue against the middleclass and not the very poor. Of course, as set forth supra, these
statements are also grossly misleading when we take into
account relative income levels of U.S. persons and the
spending on gasoline by retired persons out of savings.

VII.

“The U.S. will remain the world’s biggest oil producer this
year after overtaking Saudi Arabia and Russia as extraction of
energy from shale rock spurs the nation’s economic recovery…
U.S. production of crude oil, along with liquids separated from
natural gas, surpassed all other countries this year with daily
output exceeding 11 million barrels in the first quarter… U.S.
oil output will surge to 13.1 million barrels a day in 2019 and

Low-expenditure households devote a smaller
share of their budget to gasoline than do their
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
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Shi-Ling Hsu at 375 (2010) (“[O]ne of the persistent concerns with the
gasoline tax has to do with its purportedly regressive nature. This is a myth,
one that is reinforced by the “Do no harm effect” an aversion to causing
harm, to the point that people would prefer a greater harm to occur by
omission.”).
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Conclusion.
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sufficient income for reduced taxes to offset
their increased costs.33

plateau thereafter, according to the IEA, a Paris-based adviser
to 29 nations. The country will lose its top-producer ranking at
the start of the 2030s, the agency said in its World Energy
Outlook in November.” 31

As such, there does not appear to be an “easy” Pigovian answer
to simply shift the externality cost to the low-income
consumers of gasoline.
Nonetheless, the United States
Maritime Administration has the ability to grant waivers to the
Jones Act restrictions on shipping in U.S. coastal waters. As a
matter of international trade, the United States would benefit
by allowing incremental shipment of refined gasoline from the
Gulf Coast to the East Coast distribution terminals through
otherwise-restricted “coastal waters”. The granting of such
waiver to shipping operators would create an immediate
economic gain both in the Gulf Coast and the East Coast – and,
could increase Federal excise tax revenue under existing law.
A global environmental windfall might also occur if we assume
gasoline distribution in the East Coast of the United States is
better regulated than in the export markets of West Africa and
Latin America.

The tax policy debate focuses on how to offset the regressive
effects of incremental Federal excise taxes on gasoline on lowincome persons. Notably, the Congressional Budget Office
issued a policy report analyzing potential means to offset
higher gasoline taxes on low-income households.32 Strange
(2009-10) explains:
It would also be a mistake to believe that
reduced payroll taxes alone will offset the
regressive effect of European-style gas taxes.
Even if a poor family does not own a car and,
therefore, buys no gas directly, everything they
purchase that has a transportation component
will cost more. Unemployed poor people, or
people working on a cash basis, would receive
no benefit from reduced payroll taxes, and
underemployed poor people may not make
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Bloomberg News, U.S. Seen as Biggest Oil Producer After Overtaking
Saudi Arabia (Jul 4, 2014) citing World Energy Outlook, International
Energy Agency (Nov. 2013).
32
Terry Dinan, Offsetting a Carbon Tax’s Costs on Low-Income
Households, Congressional Budget Office
Working Paper 2012-16 (2012).
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Rick Strange, Weaving a Tangled Web: The Intersection of Energy Policy
and Broader Governmental Policies, 5 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 1, 51
(2009-10).
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